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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

BEN MILLER and JOVALLE
THOMAS,
Plaintiffs and
Respondents,

v.

)
)
)
)
}
)
)

LAWRENCE SG McMULLEN,
Defendant and
Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a tort action arising out of a semi-truckautomobile accident which occurred on the 10th day of November,
1979, 4ol miles West of Delta, in Millard County, State of

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter was tried to a
verdict favoring plaintiffso
verdict on June 24, 1981

jur~

resulting in a special

The court entered judgment on the

in favor of plaintiff, Ben Miller, in

the amount of $67,650000, and in favor of plaintiff, JoValle
Thomas, in the amount of $73,750.00.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the judgment on the
verdict.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This negligence action arose out of an accident
which occurred November 10, 1979, on U.S. Highway 6/50 in
Millard County, Utah, just west of Delta, Utah.

The respond-

ent, Ben Miller was driving a Kenworth semi-tractor-trailer
in the eastbound lane and appellant was driving a Subaru
station wagon in the westbound lane.
Because the appellant could not remember anything
about the accident, the testimony of plaintiff, Ben Miller,
was crucialo

Mr. Miller testified that the Subaru had turned

into the eastbound lane signalling to make a left hand turn
at an intersection.

After applying his brakes, Mr. Miller

elected to avoid a head-on and surely fatal collision by releasing the truck brakes and swerving into the westbound
lane in an effort to go around the appellant's Subaru.

As

he executed that evasive maneuver, appellant in the Subaru
looked up and noticed the oncoming diesel, and swerved back
into the westbound lane after Mr. Miller had committed to his
evasive maneuver.

The collision occurred in the westbound

lane.
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During negotiations between appellant's insurance
company and respondent, Mr. Miller submitted to a lie detector
examination.

A copy of the examination was furnished the

appellant's insurance company, State Farm Mutual, which
thereafter paid the $25,000.00 property damage limit of
its policy insuring appellant Lawrence McMullen.
In chambers, immediately prior to trial, Mr. Thurber,
attorney for respondents informed the court and counsel of
the existence of the polygraph test and of his desire to
introduce the results into evidence.

Mr. Ivie, attorney for

appellant, objected to such introduction.

The court

adman~

ished Mre Thurber not to mention the polygraph test in the
opening statement, indicating that the court would decide
the question of admissability later during trial when it
arose.

Mrc Thurberclidnot mention the lie detector test

in his opening statement.

Later, during cross-examination

by Mr. Ivie, Mro Miller volunteered that he had taken a

lie detector test (R. 376).
At that point, appellant's attorney asked for a
recess and made a motion for mistrial out of the presence of
the jury.

(R.

376~77)

by the Court (R. 380).

The motion was taken under advisement
The next day

at trial, the court

heard testimony, out of the presence of the jury, regarding
the circumstances under which the polygraph test was taken
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(R. 532).

The trial court denied appellant's motion for

mistrial for the reason that since defense counsel had
asserted Mr. Miller had lied on direct examination, it was
not prejudicial or preventative of a fair trial when the
witness "spontaneously blurts out" that he had passed a
polygraph test regarding the matters at issue (R. 548-59) .
The court further ruled that it would allow the polygraph
test into evidence only if the proper foundation was provided before hand to insure reliability of the results.
(R. 549-50)

Mr. Thurber reserved the right to call a

polygraph examiner in rebuttal

~v~dence

(R. 551) •

Later, during rebuttal, Mr. Thurber called Steven
Taylor, a certified polygraph examiner, as a witness.

In

establishing foundation for Mr. Taylor's testimony, Mr.
Thurber got no further than the witness's occupation when
he was interrupted by defense counsel and a recess was
calledo

The court ruled during the recess that the witness

could not testify, and he was excused.
The trial thereafter continued to its conclusion
and the jury returned a special verdict finding the appellant
100% negligent, and set damages at $67,500.00 with respect
to the driver.,

Mr. Miller, and $73,750.00 with respect to

the passenger, JoValle Thomas.
verdict in open court.

Judgment was entered on the

Thereafter, appellant made a motion
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for new trial and a motion for reduction of special damages.
Both motions were denied by the trial court October 1, 1981.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE THE COURT'S
DISCRETION IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR MISTRIAL.
Essentially, appellant's claims of error regarding
denial of his mistrial motion go to the alleged belief that
the jury was prejudiced by Ben Miller's spontaneous remark
during cross-examination about the lie detector testo
context of this volunteered statement was

The

cross~examination

in which.the appellant's attorney was attempting to show
that the witness had lied during direct examinationo

When

pressed, Mro Miller rather angrily stated that he knew what
Mro Ivie was trying to do and that he had passed a lie
detector test to verify what he was testifying was the trutho

(R. 376)
This one brief remark is the only statement that
could have possibly influenced the jury.

Appellant in his

brief quotes language from the transcript (See appellant's
brief P. 4-7) concerning the discussions regarding the

poly~

graph test; but all of those conversations were out of the
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presence of the jury and no prejudice could possibly have
resulted.

Next, appellant quotes language from·· the sub-

sequent day of trial wherein the trial judge heard testimony
out of the jury's presence regarding the test and thereafter
ruled on the mistrial motion (See appellant's brief P. 7-9).
Finally, appellant quotes language from the trial transcript
(See appellant's brief P. 9-11) wherein Mr. Thurber began to
qualify a polygraph examiner as an expert witness.

Mr.

Thurber got no further into the qualification process than
name, residence, occupation and education when he was interrupted and the court refused to allow further testimony.
Because the trial court denied the motion for mistrial and
ruled the polygraph test result would be admissible only
if the expert qualified and proper foundation was established,
it is difficult to understand how Mr. Thurber's brief preliminary questioning could possibly have prejudiced the jury.
The witness never even testified that he had conducted an
examination.
Appellant appeals the Court's denial of his mistrial
motion claiming error based upon prejudice resulting from
the witness's reference to a lie detector test, not upon
the question of admissibility of a lie detector test results.
Therefore, whether the trial court's decision to admit the
test result was error, or whether uniformity of criminal and
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civil cases regarding admissibility should exist, is not the
question.

The question is whether Mr. Miller's volunteered

statement was prejudicial under the circumstances.
A. The Granting or Denying of a Motion for Mistrial
or New Trial is Within the South Discretion of the Trial
Court. Such Discretion Will Not be Overturned Without a
Showing of Substantial-Prejudice.
The conduct of a trial lies within the trial judge's
sound discretion.

Because of the trial court's favored

position to observe the subjective effect trial incidents
have upon jurors, appellate review of the trial court's discretionary rulings is limited.

Utah law is explicit on this

pointo
"The granting of a motion for mistrial lies in
the sound discretion of the trial judge, and his
ruling should be overturned only when it clearly
appears that he abused his discretion. A mis~
trial should be granted only when it appears that
justice will be thwarted unless a jury is dis~
charged and a new trial granted." Watkins &
Faber v. Whitely, 592 P.2d 613, 616 (Utah 1979).
B. Standards of Appellate Review of a Trial Court's
Exerise of Discretionary Power.
Utah law establishes a two part standard of review.
The first part deals with abuse of discretion, and relates to
the action taken by the trial court with regard to alleged
improprieties.

The second part involves substantial preju-

dicial effect and focuses upon whether the improprieties were
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of substantial gravity to preclude a fair and impartial
trial.

The moving party must satisfy both elements before

an appellate court will overturn the trial court's action.
"The purpose of the trial is to afford the parties
a full and fair opportunity to present their
evidence and their contentions and to ha~e the
issues in dispute between them determined by a
jury; and that when that has been accomplished
we will not disturb the determination made by
... the trial court unless it is shown that there
was a substantial and prejudicial error which
prevented a fair trial, ... " Lee v. Howes,
548 P.2d 619 621 (Utah 1976).
"The broad discretionary power of the trial court
in granting or denying of new trial is well
established. And we have repeatedly expressed
our reluctance to interfere with its judgment
in such matters unless the action is clearly
unreasonable and arbitrary." Page v. Utah Home
Fire Ins. Co., 15 Utah 2d 257, 391 P.2d 290, 29293 (1964).
The trial court has broad discretionary power over
the conduct of the trial and in deciding the prejudicial
effect of any alleged improprieties.

The trial court's

exercise of such discretion will generally not be overturned
unless it is clearly demonstrated that the court abused its
discretion.

The reason for this deference to the trial court

is:
"[T]he advisability and indeed the necessity of
enabling the trial judge to properly perform
his function as the authority in charge of the
trial by giving him a reasonable latitude of
discretion in ruling on such matters.
(footnotes
omitted)
Experience teaches that just as sure as
human beings are involved, untoward happenings of

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 8 -

various kinds will continue to occur during trials.
It is the responsibility of the trial court to
rule upon questions which arise concerning whether
any such occurrence has prevented a party from
having a fair trial; ... Due to the fact that this
is primarily his responsibility; and that he is in
a position of advantage to observe the appearance,
demeanor and reactions of all persons concerned, and
the result which eventuates, his rulings on such
matters should be looked upon with iridulgence and.
should not be disturbed unless it clearly appears
that he has abused his discretion." Robinson v.
Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d, 261, 409 P.2d 121, 124
(1965)
0

As indicated, in order to justify overturning the
trial court's decision requires a clear and convincing show-

•

ing of the trial court's abuse of discretiono

This is

usually accomplished, if at all, by demonstrating to the
appellate court's satisfaction the substantial prejudice
the alleged improprieties had upon the verdicto

Rule 61

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure addresses itself to
this subject as follows:
Harmless Error
No error •.. or defect in any ruling or order of
in anything done ..• by any of the parties, is ground
for granting a new trial,.o.unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with
substantial justice. The court at every stage of
the proceeding must disregard any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
The appellant has not demonstrated either substantial
or any other prejudice arising from Mr. Miller's one single
volunteered remark toward the beginning of a three day trial.

- 9 -
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The trial judge carefully considered the remark, and heard
testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the polygraph examination of Mr. Miller.

Appellant's counsel should

have known about the polygraph test in advance of the trial
since his real client (State Farm) was fully aware of its
existence and had a copy.

If counsel thereafter pressed Mr.

Miller regarding the veracity of his story and in fact asserted
as he did that Mr. Miller was lying, he could fully expect
that the fact of the polygraph test would be volunteered.
Under these circumstances there was no abuse of the court's
discretion and certainly no substantial prejudice requiring
reversal.
POINT II
NO PREJUDICE RESULTED FROM THE TRIAL COURT'S
INSTRUCTING THE JURY REGARDING THE EFFECT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.
The trial court's decision whether to give or not
to give an instruction is another discretionary matter.

The

standards of review outlined above apply equally to such
rulings of the trial court.
The state of the law in Utah regarding informing
the jury of the effect of comparative negligence is unsettled.
Defendant cites Mc Ginn v. Utah Power and Light Co., 529 P.2d
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(Utah 1974) arguing that decision should control.

Mc Ginn

involved an Idaho comparative negligence statute, and this
court in its decision stated that the rule it was adopting
was substantive and not separable from the statute.

That

decision is not determinative of the question how the Court
should rule when faced with a case requiring application of
the Utah statute.
The recent case of Lamkin v. Lynch, 600 P.2d 530
(Utah 1979) raised grave doubts as to the validity of the
Mc Ginn rational.

The concurring and dissenting opinions

in Lamkin both indicated that Mc Ginn should be reconsiderede
The proposition that the jury should be informed of the
effect of its apportionment of fault in a special verdict is
forcibly argued by the last Professor E.Wo Thode in Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tort Feasors, and the
Effect of a

Release--~A

Triple Play by the Utah Legislature,

1973 Utah L. Rev. 306 414-418.

Professor Thode concludes

that to allow the jurors to intelligently fulfill their
sworn responsibility, they should be informed of the legal
effect of their comparison of negligenceo

Indeed,

accord~

ing to Professor Thode, failure to instruct as to the effect
may be may be affirmatively misleading.
"Absent such an instruction, a sensible juror
is likely to believe that plaintiff will re-
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cover, but that the damages will be reduced
proportionately if plaintiff's contributory
negligence is found to be less than one hundred percent. Such an assumption would be
accurate in a 'pure' comparative negligence
state, but not in Utah, where plaintiff's
negligence must be less than the defendant's
negligence for plaintiff to recover anything
from the defendant." Id. at 418.
In the present case, the special verdict (R. 196-97)
contained only five questions.

Question three, dealing with

apportionment of negligence, was not answered because in
question two, the jury found that the respondent, Ben Miller,
was not negligent.

The jury made no finding of negligence

requiring comparison which instruction 10 could have inf luenced at all.

The court's instruction, if error, is on its

face totally harmless.
Had the jury returned a

compara~ive

finding in the

range of .plaintiff fifty-five percent negligent and defendant forty five percent negligent, as happened in McGinn,
then appellant's position might have merit.

But where, as

here, the jury found the appellant one hundred percent
or wholly liable for causative fault, the questioned instruction could in no way have effected or prejudiced the jury.
Appellant has completely failed to demonstrate the substantial
prejudice

required to justify this Court's overruling

of the trial court's denial of appellant's motion for new
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trial upon the ground of claimed error in the giving of the
instruction.
CONCLUSION
The grounds for appeal asserted by appellant totally
fail to demonstrate either abuse of discretion or substantial
prejudiceo

Respondents respectfully request that the appeal

be dismissed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedingso
DATED THIS

/£

day of June, 1982 o

Respectfully submitted,

ANTHONY Mo THURBER

sc:::o._.__

Attorney for plaintiffs-respondents
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